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The Beeldenstorm and the Spanish 
Habsburg Response (1566-1570)
violet soen
In most textbooks, the punitive and military mission of the Duke of Alba to the 
Netherlands in 1567 embodies the Spanish Habsburg response to the Beeldenstorm 
of the previous year. This representation however, obscures the measures taken 
in the heat of the moment by Governor General Margaret of Parma, while it 
also downplays the numerous policy discussions to find the ‘right remedy’ for 
iconoclasm. This article argues that repression formed but one part of a broader 
pacification strategy that also included mediation, reconciliation and reform. The 
tactic employed by the Spanish Habsburg authorities combined the punishment of 
prominent leaders with a recognition that most of the participants in the ‘troubles’ 
could neither be apprehended nor punished properly, so that a pardon would 
eventually be necessary. Just such a pardon was issued in July 1570. Even if King and 
governor-general regarded iconoclasm as outright sacrilege and as divine lèse-majesté 
committed by heretics, the central authorities framed their response primarily as 
a legitimate action against worldly lèse-majesté and rebellion, in the short term to 
silence the religious violence of the iconoclasts, and in the longer term to maintain 
the initiative in safeguarding order, justice and peace, including in matters religious.
De Beeldenstorm en het Spaans-Habsburgse antwoord (1566-1570)
De strafmissie van de hertog van Alva in 1567 verschijnt in de meeste handboeken 
als het Spaans-Habsburgse antwoord op de Beeldenstorm. Deze voorstelling doet 
weinig recht aan de onmiddellijke maatregelen van de hertogin van Parma voor 
de komst van Alva, en nog minder aan de voortdurende zoektocht naar de ‘juiste 
remedie’ om de onrust te bedaren. De repressie onder Alva vormde slechts een 
deel van een bredere pacificatiestrategie, die ook verzoeningsgebaren 
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van koningswege inhield. Zo combineerde de Spaans-Habsburgse tactiek 
strafmaatregelen tegen de voornaamste leiders van de Beeldenstorm met de 
erkenning dat niet alle aanwezigen bij de ‘troebelen’ konden worden gearresteerd. 
Om rechtvaardigheid te doen geschieden, werd daarom in juli 1570 een generaal 
pardon uitgevaardigd. Daarnaast beargumenteert deze bijdrage dat hoewel 
Filips II en zijn landvoogden in Brussel de Beeldenstorm als regelrechte blasfemie 
beschouwden, ze hun optreden hoofdzakelijk rechtvaardigden als een actie tegen 
rebellie en wereldlijke majesteitsschennis, om zo op de korte termijn de religieuze 
agenda van de opstandelingen te verzwijgen, en op de lange termijn het monopolie 
te behouden inzake ordehandhaving en godsdienst. 
When around mid-August 1566 Governor-General Margaret of Parma 
learned that iconoclasm had turned into a mass movement in the 
Netherlands, she desperately wanted to flee Brussels.1 Informed of the same 
news on 3 September, King Philip II instantly developed a fever and stayed 
in bed during the following weeks.2 Both reactions are telling indications 
of how the Spanish Habsburg dynasty experienced the Beeldenstorm as an 
event turning worldly and divine order upside down. As the story goes in 
most textbooks, the straightforward response a year later consisted in the 
punitive and military expedition led by the third Duke of Alba.3 While this 
classic analysis enjoys the merit of clarity, it also obscures crucial dynamics 
1 C. Steen, Margaret of Parma: A Life (Boston, 
Leiden 2013) 176-177. Her first letter to her 
half-brother is a witness to her shame, unrest 
and anger: Margaret of Parma to Philip ii, 18 
August 1566: ags e 530 sine folio (hereafter s.f.) 
(autograph, Italian), summary in Gachard, cphii 
i, 449-450 (453). List of abbreviations: Archivo 
General de Simancas, Secretaría de Estado (ags e) 
or Secretarías Provinciales (ags sp); Archives 
Générales du Royaume, Papiers de l’État et de 
l’Audience (agr pea); Koninklijke Bibliotheek/
Bibliothèque Royale in Brussels (kbr); L.P. 
Gachard and J. Lefèvre (eds.), Correspondance 
de Philippe ii sur les affaires des Pays-Bas publiée 
d’après les originaux conservés dans les Archives 
royales de Simancas (6 vols.; Brussels 1848-1936) 
(Gachard, cphii); E. Poullet and C. Piot (eds.), 
Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle (1565-1585) 
(Brussels 1877-1896) (Poullet or Piot, cgr); G. 
Glorieux, B. Op de Beeck and E. Cockx-Indestège, 
Belgica Typographica 1541-1600: Catalogus librorum 
impressorum ab anno mdxli ad annum mdc in 
regionibus quae nunc Regni Belgarum partes 
sunt (4 vols.; Nieuwkoop 1968-1994) (bt); The 
Universal Short Title Catalogue, ongoing catalogue 
made by Andrew Pettegree et al. at St Andrews 
University, www.ustc.ac.uk (ustc). Low Countries 
and Netherlands appear as synonyms in this 
article, covering the Seventeen Provinces under 
Habsburg rule. 
2 On 18 September 1566 Philip ii informed Granvelle 
of the fever from which he had still not fully 
recovered: Poullet, cgr i, 480 (cxv), cf. Gachard, 
cphii i, 475; G. Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life 
of Philip ii (New Haven, London 2014) 149. 
3 The master narrative of the Dutch Revolt 
is currently being re-written: J. Pollmann, 
‘Internationalisering en de Nederlandse Opstand’, 
bmgn-Low Countries Historical Review (hereafter 
bmgn-lchr) 124 (2009) 515-535 doi: 10.18352/
bmgn-lchr.7045; L. Cruz, ‘Reworking the Grand 
Narrative: A Review of Recent Books on the 
Dutch Revolt’, bmgn-lchr 125 (2010) 29-38, 
doi: 10.18352/bmgn-lchr.7067.
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of post-1566 Spanish Habsburg policymaking. In fact, the Beeldenstorm threw 
councillors into doubt as to the ‘right remedy’ for the sick ‘body politic’, and 
the shocking event made them try out a vast array of tactics.4 This piecemeal 
character of the Habsburg reaction will be demonstrated here through the 
juxtaposition of the immediate actions already taken by Margaret before 
Alba’s arrival in Brussels in August 1567, and the follow-up measures under 
his governorship until 1570, the year when order and peace seemed to have 
returned.5
Much ink has already been spent on the military, legal and even fiscal 
repression under Margaret and Alba. Still, the following paragraphs will show 
that this repression was chiefly directed against those whom the King and 
his representatives identified as the leaders of the unrest, while in the end 
considerable energy was expended on the question of how to reconcile the 
remaining masses compromised by the Beeldenstorm to Crown and Church. 
Rather than with a predetermined or ‘grand strategy’6, Spanish Habsburg 
authorities countered iconoclasm and the ensuing ‘troubles’ with a patchwork 
of pacification measures, of which four will be discussed here: 1. a prohibition 
of iconoclasm, 2. an agreement with the local nobility, 3. an extraordinary 
criminal tribunal and, in the logic described above, also 4. a general pardon. 
Furthermore, these four initiatives will reveal how Spanish Habsburg 
authorities framed their response foremost as a legitimate reaction against 
worldly lèse-majesté and rebellion, even if they thought of iconoclasm as divine 
lèse-majesté and as an outright sacrilege. In this way, King and governor-general 
attempted in the short term to silence the religious violence of iconoclasts, 
and in the longer term to maintain the initiative in safeguarding order and 
peace, including in matters religious.7
4 V. Soen, Vredehandel. Adellijke en Habsburgse 
verzoeningspogingen tijdens de Nederlandse 
Opstand (1564-1581) (Amsterdam 2012); 
L. Kattenberg, ‘Het goede dieet voor de 
Nederlanden. Fadrique Furió Ceriol en het 
Spaanse denken over de Nederlandse Opstand 
1566-1573’, Skript. Historisch tijdschrift 31:4 (2014) 
206-219, 210. Furió Ceriol constantly applied 
the metaphor of the prudent doctor, and the 
‘remedios’ serve in this discourse as a means of 
obtaining pacification. 
5 G. Janssens, ‘Le Duc d’Albe, artisan de la paix et 
initiateur de la bonne gouvernance aux Pays-Bas?’, 
in: C. De Moreau de Gerbehaye, S. Dubois and 
J.-M. Yante (eds.), Gouvernance et administration 
dans les provinces belgiques (xvie-xviiie siècles). 
Ouvrage publié en hommage au Professeur Claude 
Bruneel, tome premier (Brussels 2013) 131-152. 
6 G. Parker and F. González de León, ‘The Grand 
Strategy of Philip ii and the Revolt of the 
Netherlands, 1559-1584’, in: P. Benedict et al. 
(eds.), Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France 
and the Netherlands 1555-1585 (Amsterdam 1999) 
215-232.
7 For the antecedents of the search of a state 
monopoly in religious affairs: J.A. Fühner, 
Die Kirchen- und die antireformatorische 
Religionspolitik Kaiser Karls v. in den siebzehn 
Provinzen der Niederlande 1515-1555 (Leiden, 
Boston 2004). 
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Prohibiting
When the Beeldenstorm started in Steenvoorde on 10 August 1566, the Spanish 
Habsburg dynasty had long been aware of comparable acts in other regions, 
with the Swiss Cantons and the Holy Roman Empire in the vanguard, and 
England and France experiencing more recent episodes. Nevertheless, the 
outburst of iconoclasm in their Low Countries came as a shock to King Philip II 
and his governor in Brussels, Margaret of Parma, as thus far they had been able 
to present themselves as the triumphant guardians of Catholicism north of 
the Alps. Confronted with iconoclasm in the neighbouring French Pyrenees 
from 1561 onwards, the King of Spain had fervidly rejected the pacification 
edicts of King Charles IX and his mother Catharina de’ Medici, which granted 
preliminary rights for Protestant worship in certain circumscriptions. Philip II 
often repeated that these ‘concessions’ towards Protestants would only lead to 
‘major evil’, a conclusion he felt was justified by examples from the history of the 
early church, the 1555 Augsburg Peace to ‘which his father had been compelled’, 
and above all, the ongoing religious violence in France despite the pacification 
measures. In May 1565 he even sent his consort Elisabeth de Valois to Bayonne 
to convince her brother the King and their mother that the recently concluded 
decrees of the Council of Trent were a far better instrument for restoring peace 
and order.8 He had recommended this very same policy to Margaret to counter 
the rapid advance of Calvinism, entrusting her with the promulgation and 
implementation of the Tridentine decrees in the Seventeen Provinces.9
As the recent work of Peter Arnade has made clear, Dutch iconoclasm 
did not explicitly attack royal authority, and blatant assaults on Habsburg 
symbols remained rare. Even so, iconoclasts expressed discontent with the 
exclusive Catholicism promoted by the dynasty, and with its persecution of 
Protestants.10 Beeldenstormers might have relied mainly on a local tradition 
of collective action and repertoires of revolt, yet they were also encouraged 
by the biconfessional agreements obtained in the Holy Roman Empire and 
France.11 Guido Marnef therefore has stressed that iconoclasm should also be 
8 V. Vázquez de Prada, Felipe ii y Francia (1559-1598). 
Política, Religión y Razón de Estado (Pamplona 
2004), chapter 6-7 and especially 103, 131, 152. 
9 V. Soen, ‘The Council of Trent and the 
Preconditions for the Revolt in the Netherlands 
(1563-1566)’, in: W. François and V. Soen (eds.), 
The Council of Trent (1545-1563): Reform and 
Controversy in Europe and Beyond (3 vols.; 
Göttingen, in press). 
10 P. Arnade, Beggars, Iconoclasts & Civic Patriots: 
The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, ny 
2008) 93. 
11 T.M. Safley (ed.), A Guide to Multiconfessionalism 
in the Early Modern World (Leiden, Boston 2011). 
Portraits of Margaret of Parma and the Duke of Alba, as made by Frans Hogenberg, ku Leuven – 
University of Leuven Collections of the Central University Library. 
Photo by Bruno Vandermeulen.
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understood as an acte de présence of churches which until then had operated 
clandestinely ‘under the Cross’, but which then boldly asserted their existence 
within the city walls.12 Conscious of these politico-religious demonstrations, 
Margaret despairingly confessed to her closest advisors that the restoration 
of religion should now be the first priority, and Philip II proclaimed that the 
rioters had committed divine lèse-majesté. Both coincided in their assessments 
of iconoclasts as canaille acting upon emotion instead of reason.13 Despite this 
context of outraged indignation about the sacrilege and heresy committed 
by iconoclasts, this article will argue that the Spanish Habsburg authorities 
mostly adopted a politico-juridical discourse to counter iconoclasm, and it 
will explain why they did so.
The first official reply on 25 August 1566 – some fifteen days after 
the first iconoclastic riots in Steenvoorde, and only five days after the 
violent outburst in Antwerp – already provides a telling demonstration of 
this process. Iconoclasm and all future variants were instantly forbidden 
by a general law of the central authorities, as usual codified in a placcart et 
ordonnance (placcaet ende ordinantie) issued in Brussels in the name of Philip 
II.14 To be sure, the King had no hand in drafting this ‘prompt remède 
provisional’, as the news had not even reached his ears (and in this instance 
it took longer than the average two weeks) and as he would be expected to 
approve the prohibition of iconoclasm in any case. Instead, the ordinance 
was proclaimed by the governor-general, and hastily drafted in the Brussels 
councils, leading to curious differences between its French and Dutch 
versions. The text itself insisted that the proscription of iconoclasm had been 
endorsed by the ‘very beloved and loyal Knights of our Order’ (of the Golden 
Fleece) and the members of the Council of State adjunct to the governor-
general. Margaret could proceed so quickly because she had already convoked 
a crisis meeting with provincial governors and Knights of the Golden Fleece 
before any act of iconoclasm had actually occurred, in order to deal with the 
penury of the treasury, and the quick spread of Protestantism. 
12 G. Marnef, ‘The Dynamics of Reformed Religious 
Militancy: The Netherlands 1566-1585’, in: 
P. Benedict et al., Reformation, Revolt and Civil War, 
51-68. 
13 A. Lottin, ‘Pour une nouvelle lecture de 
l’iconoclasme aux Pays-Bas (1566)’, in: A. Lottin, 
Être et croire à Lille et en Flandre xvie-xviiie siècle: 
Recueil des études (Arras 2000) 277-285; Steen, 
Margaret, 176-177.
14 Placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire, pour 
remedier aux saccaigemens, pilleries & Ruynes 
des Temples, Eglises, Cloistres & Monasteres: Et 
donner ordre à l’Emotion populaire en ces Pays 
d’embas (Brussels 1566) (ustc 13085); Placcaet 
ende ordinantie ons heeren des Conincx om 
die plunderinghe, pillerye, scheyndinghe ende 
bederffenisse vanden kercken, cloisters ende 
Godshuysen te verhoeden ende remedieren. Ende 
teghens die beroerte ende commotie vanden volcke in 
desen Nederlanden ordene te stellen (Brussels 1566) 
(ustc 402953). 
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As such, the prohibition of iconoclasm with severe capital 
punishments supplemented the already impressive body of anti-heresy 
legislation that the Habsburg dynasty had elaborated ever since the famous 
Edict of Worms of 1521. Especially in the Netherlands, the central authorities 
had defined and redefined with general laws (placcarts or placcaeten) which 
acts of divine lèse-majesté entailed worldly lese-majesty as well, and thus 
had to be brought before their (rather than ecclesiastical) jurisdictions.15 In 
practice, almost all deeds linked with Protestant ideas had been identified 
as an infringement upon these anti-heresy laws (contravention aux placcarts), 
making capital punishment and confiscation tangible threats for Protestant 
believers and their sympathisers. The anti-heresy legislation in the Seventeen 
Provinces was acknowledged as the most rigid in Europe, even by Philip ii 
himself. As a result, and much as had happened in France around that time, 
a league entitled the ‘Compromise of the Nobility’ protested publicly against 
this repressive system. By April 1566 it submitted a Request asking for the 
abolition of all kinds of religious persecution, conveniently labelled as ‘the 
Inquisition’. Despite its lobbying for more religious freedom, in June and 
July 1566, a quadrupally issued edict forbade Protestant hedge preaching 
and conventicles occurring all over the country.16 The decree of 25 August 
prohibiting iconoclasm thus was added to the list of proscribed heterodox 
acts: iconoclasts henceforth would be tried before secular courts, despite 
the recent Tridentine assertion of episcopal visitations and courts to control 
orthodoxy. This prohibition thus went into far more detail about forbidden 
acts than about beliefs. Iconoclasm was described first as the sacking of church 
buildings and the pillaging of books, and only thereafter as the destruction 
of statues and other sacred ‘things’, amongst which the blasphemy of the 
Holy Sacrament counted as the ‘worst act’. Offenders were only occasionally 
qualified as iconoclastes or kerkscheynders, with the word heretics never 
mentioned and sectarissen only once. Rather, iconoclasts appeared as villainous 
robbers, thieves, enemies of ‘God’, of ‘Us’, and of ‘the Country’ (in the Dutch 
version) and ‘the World’ (in the French version) and even more secularly, 
as séditieux (traitors), rebels and disturbers of the public peace. Accused of 
acting against the ‘common land of herwaertsovere’ (in the Dutch version) or 
the ‘Fatherland’ (in the French version), they were denounced as giving a bad 
15 A. Goosens, Les inquisitions modernes dans les 
Pays-Bas méridionaux (1520-1633) (2 vols.; Brussels 
1997-1998). 
16 Ordinantie s’conyncx [...] daerby verboden ende 
gheinterdicteert werden alle conventiclen, ende 
ongheoirloofde vergaderinghe secrete oft openbare 
(Ghegheven in [...] Bruessele [...] den derden [...] julio 
xvc zessentsestich) (Ghent 1566) (bt 7271), forming 
part of the series 6 June, 18 June, 3 July and 18 July. 
A Spanish councillor annotated a copy in ags e 
531, f. 98 and noted down that the punishments 
were less severe than the Caroline legislation of 
1555. 
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example to le peuple and engaging it in popular ‘commotion’ and ‘emotion’. 
Hence, iconoclasts were degraded as more regular traitors, rebels or thieves, 
by which their religious motives were largely passed over in silence, perhaps 
in a final attempt to deprive them of any forum other than iconoclasm itself.17 
Moreover, the prohibition also included a ban on carrying weapons, except by 
soldiers on duty. Those who continued to take up arms were to be punished as 
rebels. As such, in a final act of degrading iconoclasts, they lost (at least legally) 
their opportunity to die taking up the sword to defend their religious ideas. 
Even more directly, the edict licensed everyone and anyone to kill iconoclasts 
‘as one does with a common enemy’. This prescription originated in medieval 
common law, which declared disturbers of the public peace to be outlaws; 
hence, again iconoclasm was framed as a disturbance of public order rather 
than as an act of divine lèse-majesté. 
Given the longer tradition of heresy laws casting Protestantism as 
worldly lèse-majesté, the discourse of the placcart seems remarkably subtle 
though. With the impending risk of civil war, the straightforward prohibition 
of the ‘sack of temples’ truly became an exercise of diplomatic phrasing: 
rather than to punish, the ordinance was said to remedy and to restore order. 
This remediation discourse had been ‘in the making’ since the 1560s when the 
metaphor of the ‘sick body’ of the state euphemised the rapid spread of the 
Reformation and the critical state of the treasury. The placcart formulated the 
appropriate punishments even more carefully, given the ongoing controversy 
about the usefulness (for some) and the harshness (for most others) of the anti-
heresy legislation. Margaret had already proposed a so-called ‘Moderation’ of 
the penalties, in order to meet the first Request of the Confederated Nobility, 
but the King had rejected her approach.18 Surprisingly then, the 25 August 
placcart included alleviated penalties: it announced that iconoclasts would 
not be burnt at the stake (as Philip still wanted), but that the gallows would 
be applied as a means of ‘pacification’. Confiscation would only occur in those 
regions where confiscation for religious matters was already permitted, in 
an attempt to soften the loud criticism of the infringement of privileges. 
Those magistrates failing to prohibit iconoclasm would receive arbitrary 
(instead of the usual capital) punishment. Despite the accommodation in 
tone and punishment, the practice of persecution and punishment did not 
fundamentally change, and the mitigation of stake to gallows was mainly 
cosmetic. Just as the iconoclasts were downgraded to rebels, they were also 
deprived of the opportunity (and forum) to be burnt as a martyr. The decree of 
25 August 1566 thereby became another milestone in the Habsburg quest to 
17 D. Nicholls, ‘The Theatre of Martyrdom in the 
French Reformation’, Past & Present 121 (1988) 
49-73.
18 Concept de placcart de la moderation des anchiens 
placcartz sur le fait de la religion, ags sp 2604, 
s.f. (French, copy), further discussed in Soen, 
Vredehandel, 59-64. 
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be the first resort for persecuting heterodoxy and safeguarding Catholicism 
in the Seventeen Provinces. Still, the mitigations had to demonstrate that the 
Habsburg authorities were to some extent willing to meet the criticism of the 
malcontents, and its political tone had to make the overture in the ongoing 
negotiations with the Compromise of the Nobility.
Reassuring
Rather than on the prohibition of iconoclasm, historiography has 
concentrated on the Habsburg agreement with the malcontent nobility 
reached on the same date of 25 August 1566.19 As the most remarkable and 
probably most unexpected result of the Beeldenstorm, the Compromise of 
the Nobility was forced to disband.20 Only three weeks earlier, the league of 
noblemen and urban elites had felt strong enough to submit a second Request 
in Brussels, yet now the leaders were obliged to swear solemnly in the same 
Coudenberg Palace that their confederation was ‘nil, broken and dissolved’.21 
A double dynamic forced this dissolution. First, some members themselves 
had been traumatised by the ‘fury’ and become frightened of the ‘popular’ 
forces which seemed to be beyond their control, and most were troubled that 
public opinion blamed them for starting the whole iconoclastic movement. 
Second, the crisis meeting concluded that the confederated noblemen should 
use their authority for the restoration of order, and no longer to protect hedge 
preaching, as had happened in lordships all over the Seventeen Provinces. The 
metaphor of the ‘sick’ body politic was advanced again: during the Fury and 
Rage of the ‘lower parts’ of society, the nobility had to act as the ‘reasonable 
head’, defending King and Faith according to the duties inherent to their 
estate. The agreement in fact was mediated by the Knights of the Golden 
Fleece, and especially by the triad of the Prince of Orange and the Counts 
19 Copie des lettres patentes en forme d’asseurance 
que la ducesse de Parme, regente etc a donne aux 
gentilzhommes confederez (Brussels, 1566) (ustc 
79032) (bt 2490, kbr lp 1433 A), Copie des lettres 
d’asseurance aux confederez, 23 (25) August 1566: 
ags sp 2604, s.f., a Dutch translation in P.C. Bor, 
Oorsprongk, begin, en vervolgh der Nederlandsche 
oorlogen, beroerten (4 vols.; Amsterdam 1679-
1684) i, 96. An English translation was printed in 
London. Margaret later considered the pressure 
to amount to compulsion, a valid reason to 
rescind any agreement. The version was printed 
only after 27 of August, as it mentions that the 
lord of Tilly and François d’Haesten had pledged 
their oath and signed the agreement on that date. 
20 H.F.K. van Nierop, ‘A Beggars’ Banquet: The 
Compromise of the Nobility and the Politics of 
Inversion’, European History Quarterly 21 (1991) 
419-443; see for their relationship with the 
high nobility: L. Geevers, Gevallen vazallen. De 
integratie van Oranje, Egmont en Horn in de Spaans-
Habsburgse monarchie (1559-1567) (Amsterdam 
2008) 165-171. 
21 ‘nul, cassé, absolu’: Serment solempnel faicte par les 
confederez le 25 d’aoust 1566 d’entretenir les poincts 
icy declairez, 25 August 1566: ags sp 2604, s.f.
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of Egmond and Hornes, who had never adhered to the Compromise of the 
Nobility and could cast themselves as honest brokers. The governor-general, 
refusing to be in the same room with the confederated nobility, felt forced to 
accept the deal to recover the malcontent nobility for the Catholic cause.
This agreement also took a mild tone, validating this contribution’s 
main argument: the members of the disbanded league obtained open letters 
in the form of an ‘assurance’ (lettres patentes en forme d’asseurance). They would 
be absolved in perpetuity from any accusation of having initiated iconoclasm, 
and the text confirmed that they had always dutifully served the King. Their 
lives and goods would be safe, as long as they helped to restore order and 
to prevent iconoclasm (in this text labelled ‘robbery’). The asseurance in fact 
was something the members of the league had asked for themselves in their 
second Request: they did not want ‘pardon’, as they had done nothing wrong, 
but an ‘assurance’ of life and goods would provide them with the immunity 
they sought. In return for these concessions, they had to ‘chase’ all those 
sacking churches and to cast out all ‘foreigners’, ‘rebels’ and ‘enemies of the 
King’. Despite the mild tone, the agreement formally limited the role of the 
nobility from the religious peacemakers they aspired to be (like their German 
and French counterparts) to being defenders of Catholicism. 
The arrangement included an important caveat, which the late 
Juliaan Woltjer identified as the ‘first victory’ for the moderate party as it 
allowed provisional rights for Protestants.22 Still, the caveat was more curious 
and confused than Woltjer suggests, and the messy drafting process of the 
agreement added to the many misunderstandings about the clauses: the 
lettres patentes were first signed on 23 August, reissued with modifications on 
25 August, and published only some days afterwards with the oath pledged 
by the majority of the leaders of the Compromise on 25 and 27 August. The 
Compromise indeed seemed to have obtained in a first stage the concession 
that Protestant preaching was henceforth allowed in those places outside 
the city walls where it had occurred before 23 August. This clause was thus 
in apparent contradiction to the July prohibition of all Protestant preaching 
mentioned above, but it was most probably vetoed by Margaret. In any 
case, it was changed in the final printed version which stated that former 
adherents of the Compromise had to prevent preaching where it had never 
taken place, and where it had taken place before 23 August it could no longer 
occur under armed protection, and above all, the preachers could not cause 
‘scandal’ or unrest in the body social. The permission for unarmed Protestant 
preaching (not even worship) was thus implicit, and had to be deduced from 
the text. Still, the governor-general allowed ‘the inquisition of which they 
22 J.J. Woltjer, ‘De vrede-makers’, Tijdschrift 
voor Geschiedenis 89 (1976) 229-321 and an 
updated version in idem, ‘Political Moderates 
and Religious Moderates in the Revolt of the 
Netherlands’, in: P. Benedict et al., Reformation, 
Revolt and Civil War, 185-200; and a final 
evaluation by idem, Op weg naar tachtig jaar 
oorlog (Amsterdam 2011) 381-383. 
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complained’ would stop, and abrogated the handful of inquisitorial titles 
granted by King and Pope. She also promised to re-initiate the plan for the 
‘Moderation’ with the King in order to mitigate the heresy laws in force. It is 
clear that confederates refusing to drop their opposition and many Calvinists 
summarised the agreement as ‘the end of the inquisition’, and spread the 
message in this sloganeering way. The unofficial but most charismatic leader 
of the movement, Hendrik, Lord of Brederode, did not agree to the dissolution 
consented to by his confrères, and deftly exploited the textual differences 
between the agreements of 23 and 25 August. All this caused misconceptions 
as to what was permitted and what not.23 
Many local histories of the post-Beeldenstorm period have noted the 
inconsistent reception of the 23-25 August Agreement in the Seventeen 
Provinces. Some cities never proclaimed the lettres patentes en forme d’asseurance 
at all, while others implemented local agreements with the Protestants that 
stretched what had been permitted.24 Some former confederates helped in 
the punishment of iconoclasts, others alleged that they were not obliged to 
do so for acts that had happened before 23 or 25 August. Most provincial 
governors proceeded with the exemplary banishment or punishment of 
iconoclasts, although they were not able to stop the Protestant movement 
altogether, as Orange, Egmond and Hornes were to experience respectively in 
Antwerp, Ghent and Tournai. The legal uncertainties caused many subjects to 
flee, fearing repression as ‘outlaws’, while other exiles returned anticipating 
the ‘end of the inquisition’ and further multi-confessional arrangements. 
Internationally, the curious formulation of the 23-25 August Agreement led 
to speculation: during an embassy in Brussels in 1567, some Lutheran princes 
of the Holy Roman Empire suggested to Margaret that she should enlarge it 
along the lines of the Augsburg treaty while excluding the Calvinists from the 
deal.25 
To sum up, the immediate response to the Beeldenstorm by central 
authorities consisted of two hastily drafted legal texts: one placcart (general 
law) for all inhabitants of the Netherlands, and one set of lettres patentes 
(particular privileges) for its formerly confederated nobility. The two 
23 For the different ‘kinds’ of inquisition, see 
G. Gielis and V. Soen, ‘The Inquisitorial Office in 
the Sixteenth-Century Low Countries: A Dynamic 
Perspective’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 
66 (2015) 47-66; on the ‘myth’ created around 
all kinds of persecution together: F. Beemon, 
‘The Myth of the Spanish Inquisition and the 
Preconditions for the Dutch Revolt’, Archiv für 
Reformationsgeschichte 85 (1994) 246-264.
24 Amongst the many local histories, M. Hageman, 
Het kwade exempel van Gelre. De stad Nijmegen, de 
Beeldenstorm en de Raad van Beroerten, 1566-1568 
(Nijmegen 2005). 
25 M. Weis, ‘La Paix d’Augsbourg de 1555: Un 
modèle pour les Pays-Bas?: L’ambassade 
des princes luthériens allemands auprès de 
Marguerite de Parme en 1567’, in: Entre Royaume 
et Empire: Frontières, rivalités et modèles (Neuchâtel 
2002) 87-100. 
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sets of law and the deliberate vagueness of some clauses gave leeway to 
misinterpretations, most often exploited by the opponents of royal authority. 
By November 1566 the governor-general and the Council of State agreed on 
a first phase to restore order in those cities where before 25 August no hedge 
preaching had taken place (and thus there could be no legal contestation). In a 
second phase they would restore religion in all cities, including Valenciennes 
and Antwerp, where Calvinists had obtained some rights of worship in 
local deals. Here, they proceeded following the legal argument that the 
August agreements had been concluded under duress and thus could be 
revoked, and that Protestant preaching in any form caused ‘scandal’. By May 
1567, Margaret was able to finish her task in Antwerp, where she withdrew 
all earlier concessions to Protestants, though providing some symbolic 
mitigation of their persecution.26 She soon insisted on the restoration of 
damaged churches and required ‘justifications’ of city magistrates.27 So while 
the legal answers temporarily conveyed an impression of experimenting with 
multi-confessionalism, in practice everybody understood that in the long run 
Spanish Habsburg authorities meant to promote Tridentine Catholicism. 
Punishing
The Madrid deliberations only started after the King’s recovery from his 
fever. To that end, the Consejo de Estado assembled and reassembled over the 
autumn of 1566, and in its meetings heated clashes occurred over the proper 
strategy to pacify the Netherlands.28 By the end of September all agreed that 
after the ‘heretical attacks’ a military intervention was the safest option to 
defend the honour of God and King. The possibility of Philip ii travelling 
to the Netherlands in person remained a point of discussion. According to 
26 G. Janssens, ‘De ordonnantie betreffende de 
pacificatie van de beroerten te Antwerpen 
(24 mei 1567). Breekpunt voor de politiek van 
Filips ii ten overstaan van de Nederlanden’, 
Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor de 
uitgave der oude wetten en verordeningen van België 
50 (2012) 105-132, including text edition.
27 Amongst other ordinances, she issued on 
14 February 1567 an instruction to repair and 
restore the damaged churches: A. Spicer, ‘After 
Iconoclasm: Reconciliation and Resacralization in 
the Southern Netherlands, ca. 1566-85’, Sixteenth 
Century Journal 44 (2013) 411-433. 
28 There was no separate ‘Consejo de Flandes’, 
though Joachim Hopperus, Keeper of the 
Seal, acted as main advisor on policy for the 
Netherlands. P.D. Lagomarsino, Court Factions 
and Formulation of Spanish Policy towards the 
Netherlands (PhD University of Cambridge 1974) 
suggested the existence of a more ‘pacifist’ Eboli 
faction and a ‘vindicatory’ faction around the 
Duke of Alba. His rigid interpretation of these 
factional clashes has been nuanced in several 
respects. For an overview see: V. Soen, ‘Philip ii’s 
Quest: The Appointment of Governors-General 
during the Dutch Revolt (1559-1598)’, bmgn-lchr 
126 (2011) 3-29, doi: /10.18352/bmgn-lchr.7217. 
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medieval tradition his presence was considered a (somewhat magical) solution 
to appease rebellion and, more recently, a remedy to contain the Reformation. 
In 1559 Philip ii had travelled from Brussels to the Iberian Peninsula after 
the discovery of crypto-Protestant circles in Madrid and Valladolid. In the 
following years the Pope, the Emperor, Cardinal Granvelle and Margaret of 
Parma all urged the King to return to Brussels to stop Protestantism there as 
well. While after the Beeldenstorm royal councillors unanimously agreed on the 
necessity of a journey, they could not agree on its timing: should Philip travel 
immediately with the army, or did an army first have to restore order so that 
the King would arrive as a Forgiving Father? The dilemma came to an end 
when the Ottomans attacked in the Mediterranean, and when in less than half 
a year Philip ii became a widower without an heir. In these times of dynastic 
instability and military mobilisation, the voyage was postponed indefinitely 
(and as it would turn out, permanently).29 
Out of necessity, the royal pacification strategy was now to consist 
of two phases – an army would precede the arrival of Philip II, pre-empting 
the fear of an ‘escalation of potential disasters’ and a domino reaction in the 
Spanish Habsburg Empire. The rest of the ‘grand strategy’ has been well 
documented by Geoffrey Parker and others: hearing the reassuring news of 
Margaret’s campaigns, the size of the military contingent was reduced to 
‘only’ 10,000 soldiers. After two other captains refused the honour, the Duke 
of Alba accepted the command, despite his advanced age and his hope of 
staying near the King. Remarkably, while the Consejo de Estado emphasised 
defending ‘God’s Holy Name’, the military reaction was framed and staged as 
an intervention against rebels, even before William of Orange fled the country 
and started an open revolt against his overlord. In this case, this mostly 
secular argumentation enabled the King to recruit mercenary troops from the 
Holy Roman Empire, while raising support for his cause there as well, even 
amongst Lutheran princes.30 
The royal deliberations repudiated most of the earlier measures 
taken by Margaret. The King annulled the lettres patentes of August 1566, 
and even withdrew her agreement with the city of Antwerp of May 1567. 
For this and other reasons, she decided to resign upon the arrival of Alba. 
The result was that the Duke arrived not only as commander-in-chief of the 
troops but also as the new governor-general. His strictness and severity had 
been long known from previous interventions in the Empire, while his new 
29 G. Parker, ‘1567: The End of the Dutch Revolt?’, 
in: A. Crespo Solana and M. Herrero Sánchez 
(eds.), España y las 17 provincias de los Países Bajos. 
Una revisión historiográfica (xvi-xviii) (2 vols.; 
Cordoba 2002) i, 269-290; G. Janssens, Brabant in 
het verweer. Loyale oppositie tegen Spanje’s bewind 
in de Nederlanden van Alva tot Farnese 1567-1578 
(Kortrijk, Heule 1989).
30 G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish 
Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory 
and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (Cambridge 
1972) and his other numerous publications. 
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letters of commission conferred upon him the right to punish ‘rebels’ and 
the instigators of the troubles, with the final aim being to restore order and 
justice. Invested with these exceptional powers, he proceeded immediately 
with the erection of a new tribunal, known as the Council of ‘Troubles’, 
with an overarching jurisdiction in all Seventeen Provinces, superseding 
the secular courts entrusted with the execution of the anti-heresy laws. This 
Council had to judge case by case, and could proceed swiftly to arrests, trials 
and confiscations in following up on the inquiries already carried out under 
Margaret. Its many executions (estimated at more than a thousand) and 
banishments (estimated at around 11,000) soon resulted in the Tribunal being 
nicknamed the Council of Blood.31
During the heat of the Iconoclastic Fury, the lettres patentes had tried 
to regain discontented noblemen for the Habsburg and Catholic cause, but 
under the governorship of Alba they faced persecution. For the King and his 
councillors, the Beeldenstorm only added to their much older mistrust that 
(the greater part of) the nobility in the Netherlands – high or low, member 
of the Compromise or not – was to be held responsible for the calamities. 
The grandees Orange, Egmond and Hornes were particular scapegoats: 
their mediation for the Agreement of 23-25 August and later local deals 
with Protestants discredited all of them even further at the Spanish Court. 
Also the allegation that they had not done enough to implement the decrees 
of the Council of Trent became a powerful denunciation against them. 
In this context, Alba had received two special commissions, on 24 March 
and on 15 April 1567, to proceed against the Knights of the Golden Fleece 
despite the privileges allowing them to be judged solely by and before 
their peers. Orange prudently fled before Alba’s arrival, while Egmond and 
Hornes were almost immediately arrested and by June 1567 executed. The 
two aristocrats had been shocked, believing they had fostered the peace-
making process on the ground. Their trial before the Council of Troubles 
was framed mainly in terms of treason and worldly lèse-majesté. Alba 
considered this ‘dirty job’ as a means to pave the way for the arrival of the 
King, who would henceforth reign over loyal vassals and subjects, albeit 
who first had to be pardoned for their misconduct during the Troubles. 
31 G. Marnef and H. De Schepper, ‘Conseil des 
Troubles (1567-1576)’, in: E. Aerts (ed.), Les 
institutions du gouvernement central des Pays-
Bas Habsbourgeois (1483-1795) (2 vols.; Brussels 
1995) i, 470-478. In this period the presence of 
the Augustinian monk Lorenzo de Villavicencio 
also added to the formulation of radical policies 
regarding the Low Countries: G. Dorren, ‘Por 
la honra de Dios: Informadores del rey sobre la 
situación en Flandes (1564-1566), in: J. Martínez 
Millán (ed.), Felipe ii (1527-1598): Europa y la 
Monarquía Católica: Tomo i: El Gobierno de la 
Monarquía (Corte y Reinos) (Madrid 1998) i, 161-
168.
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Pardoning
Still less well known than Alva’s repression remain the plans for a general 
pardon after the Beeldenstorm.32 Though with hindsight the Habsburg 
repression might seem extremely well organised, most councillors in Brussels 
and Madrid acknowledged that the existing tribunals could only punish 
leading iconoclasts and that the military troops could only defeat the foremost 
rebels. A punitive expedition and an exceptional criminal court could restore 
order in the end, but they would neither return peace in the body politic, nor 
bring justice to those many inhabitants who had contravened the placcarts in 
attending hedge preaching or iconoclasm. So after the Beeldenstorm, a general 
pardon was proposed as a collective measure of grace for the ‘multitude’ which 
had been compromised during the troubles, in order to remove their crimes 
from the body politic and to start with a clean sheet. In the post-1566 policy 
the general pardon was the most concrete measure of appeasement that was 
discussed, and eventually also the first one to materialise.
Both in Brussels and Madrid the advantages of this pacification 
strategy were reformulated over and over, though with changing advocates 
and even more opponents.33 The advocates argued that by means of a general 
pardon the King should demonstrate his innate clemency, a virtue cherished 
by such classical philosophers as Cicero and Seneca and cultivated by the 
Habsburg dynasty since Emperor Maximilian I. In the ideal case, these 
‘doves’ argued, Philip ii should proclaim a general pardon during his Entry 
into Brussels to inaugurate peace and mark the end of the repression. For his 
subjects, a collective grace could bring consolation in times of executions and 
confiscations: the remorseful minor sinners would have an opportunity for a 
formal and symbolic reconciliation with their overlord, and even those who 
had not done something wrong would be inspired by love for their ruler. As 
the repression under Alba hardened, some councillors argued that a general 
pardon would soften the edges of the severity of his regime. In the end, even 
Cardinal Granvelle argued that a general pardon would be necessary to win 
back the hearts and minds of the King’s Dutch vassals. Also local bishops 
lobbied Alba and his confessor for a general pardon, using the religious 
repertoire of arguments: they insisted on the Christian virtues of forgiveness 
32 The information in the following paragraphs 
stems from: V. Soen, Geen pardon zonder 
paus! Studie over de complementariteit van het 
koninklijk en pauselijk generaal pardon (1570-
1574) en over inquisiteur-generaal Michael Baius 
(1560-1576) (Brussels 2007). Also under Charles 
v general pardons (understood as terms for 
reconciliation with the Catholic Church) 
were granted to Anabaptists. V. Soen, ‘De 
reconciliatie van ‘ketters’ in de zestiende-eeuwse 
Nederlanden (1520-1590)’, Trajecta. Tijdschrift 
voor de geschiedenis van het katholiek leven in de 
Nederlanden 14 (2005) 337-362.
33 This and following paragraph was earlier 
developed in: V. Soen, ‘C’estoit comme songe et 
mocquerie de parler de pardon. Obstructie bij een 
pacificatiemaatregel (1566-1567)’, bmgn 119 (2004) 
309-328, doi: 0.18352/bmgn-lchr.6082.
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and mercy, and were convinced that a pardon would spark new (or needed) 
conversions and reconciliations, especially as the spread of Protestantism had 
still not been stopped.
Opposition to the proposal meant that a general pardon only 
materialised after four years of discussion. ‘Hawks’ were mostly afraid that a 
general pardon would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Lawyers argued 
that it was impossible to permit collective mercy, as it would ignore the variety 
of crimes committed and thus create further injustice. Prudent advisors only 
wanted to apply a general pardon as the ‘final remedy, when the doctor had 
run out of other medicine’; in the meantime they preferred to await the results 
of the work of the Council of Troubles. Even if one approved of a pardon, all 
agreed that certain individuals or categories still had to be excluded from 
this royal grace: a general pardon was never meant to be general, in the old 
Senecan adage that forgiving everyone was as unjust as punishing everyone. 
The discussions of who could and who could not be included dragged the 
whole process out even longer. Finally, all were of the opinion that the general 
pardon should come at the ‘right’ moment, and that the military campaigns 
of William of Orange and his brothers meant that the King should wait a 
little longer. Alba in particular played upon this last argument and often 
singlehandedly deferred the pardon. When in 1567 Philip II cancelled his 
journey to the Netherlands and proposed to send his half-brother with a 
general pardon, the Duke vetoed the plan. In 1568 when the King argued that 
the anticipated victory over Orange would be the ideal occasion to promulgate 
a pardon, Alba did not answer, leading the King to think that a courier had 
got lost. Afterwards, he delayed further by sending four possible drafts 
and formulations of a general pardon to be discussed in Madrid, and when 
Philip II finally signed the pardon in November 1569, the governor-general 
still postponed the promulgation by six months, allegedly waiting for the 
‘right moment’.
The final text of the pardon34, mostly drafted by Alba and his 
councillors and only slightly changed in Madrid, set out at length why the 
King had first implemented the voie de force and now opened up the voie de 
douceur. It insisted that a ‘multitude’ had been involved in the troubles (by 
then the generic term for the Beeldenstorm and the military confrontations 
combined) out of ‘curiosity or inconsideration’, others out of ‘youth’ or 
‘simplicity’. It also stressed the innate royal virtue of clemency, imitating 
God’s mercy. Those who were prepared to be reconciled first with the Catholic 
Church – facilitated by an accompanying pardon from Pope Pius V – could 
34 Grace et pardon general donné par le Roy nostre 
Sire : A cause des troubles passez (Brussels 1570) 
(ustc 4066 digitised copy from Ghent University 
Library in Google Books). A more extensive list 
of versions of this publication (and the general 
pardons of 1572 and 1574) is to be found in Soen, 
Geen pardon zonder paus, appendix ii-iii-iv.
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receive grace and pardon within a reconciliation term of two months (later 
extended to three months to match the papal pardon). Applicants did not 
have to file a separate request for a letter of remission with the local or central 
administrations, yet they had to be reconciled with the delegated priests, 
accept the Tridentine confession of faith and perform penance. Policy debates 
had hesitated long over whether it would be preferable to exclude categories 
of persons or to exclude named individuals, but Alba had decided to omit 
broadly defined groups from the royal grace. Besides Reformed ministers and 
rebel leaders, the general pardon excluded those who had destroyed or burned 
cloisters, churches and images, or who would do so in future.
It was with much pomp and circumstance that Alba announced the 
general pardon on Sunday 16 July 1570. The city of Antwerp became the 
preferred place to demonstrate the return of peace, to both local citizens and 
international merchants. During a pontifical mass in the cathedral, the newly 
installed bishop of Antwerp, Franciscus Sonnius, first made Pope Pius V’s 
pardon known. Court preacher and bishop of Arras, François Richardot, 
elucidated the divine and royal virtue of clemency and mercy during his 
sermon, (probably literally) pointing out the marks of iconoclasm in the nave 
of the church. He emphasised the analogy between the general pardon and 
the temple of God, which should be decorated, maintained and, after the 
unrest, restored.35 In the afternoon, Alba promulgated the general pardon 
during a ceremony which underlined royal forgiveness: servants were dressed 
in white (innocence) and gold (royalty), and a specially constructed stage 
before the city hall marked the solemnity of the event. Later on, the text of the 
general pardon was read out in most cities on Sunday 30 July, usually after a 
sermon in the main parish church proclaiming the papal pardon. According 
to most contemporary observers, the carefully planned pardon ceremonies 
were a failure in communication and appreciation: there were no immediate 
signs of joy, but instead murmuring and noise, and after a while, much overt 
disappointment and discontent.
Just as with every other Habsburg action in these critical years, a 
counter propaganda campaign questioned the sincerity of the general pardon, 
merging it into the Black Legend and the earlier criticism of ‘the Inquisition’. 
The summary in the chronicle of the Lutheran Godevaert Van Haecht 
neatly illustrates the bad reception of the pacification measure amongst the 
Antwerp citizens: the general pardon ‘is in effect no other than the Spanish 
Inquisition which has been read out, because the conclusion of the pardon 
is that henceforth one should live according to the Catholic Faith or one 
35 G. Janssens, ‘Superexcellat autem misericordia 
iudicium: The Homily of François Richardot on 
the solemn announcement of the General Pardon 
in the Netherlands (Antwerp, 15 july 1570)’, in: 
J. Pollmann and A. Spicer (eds.), Public Opinion 
and Changing Identities in the Early Modern 
Netherlands: Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke 
(Leiden, Boston 2007) 107-123.
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
The official translation [translaet] of the general pardon, Brussels, 
Michel de Hamont, 1570.
Copy in the possession of the author, gift from Gustaaf Janssens.
Photo by Sophie Verreyken.
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incurs danger. And that is for sure’.36 Pamphlets and songs contended that 
the pardon was not necessary, as Dutch subjects had done nothing wrong; 
citizens warned each other that the invitation to approach local priests was 
an underhand means for the Council of Troubles to arrest those it had not yet 
apprehended. These rumours, pamphlets and songs ensured that the general 
pardon had a lukewarm reception, and the Duke of Alba came to consider 
the pardon a missed opportunity and an unnecessary measure. He also did 
little to foster the pardon, as soon as possible initiating prosecutions and 
executions of those ‘who had not taken advantage of the pardon’. Still, the 
nay-saying of Alba and of his opponents contrasted with the hopeful reports 
of most bishops, who worked hard to put the pardon into effect. The bishop of 
Ghent discussed the possibility of pardon repeatedly in his Sunday sermons, 
while the bishop of Roermond informed locals about it during his visitation 
travels. From their reports, most bishops seemed to be quite satisfied: the 
bishop of Antwerp reported 14,128 reconciliati within the city walls, the bishop 
of Ghent 6,000, and the bishop of ’s-Hertogenbosch 4,000. To calculate exact 
numbers remains impossible, as there were many uncertainties about the 
validity of the reconciliations carried out by priests but not (yet) endorsed 
by local administrations. Guido Marnef has indicated that these impressive 
numbers of reconciliati belonged to the ‘middle groups’, which did not make 
definitive confessional choices but were prepared to obtain at least an official 
reconciliation with Church and King in those troublesome years.37 Hence, 
for thousands of the inhabitants of the Seventeen Provinces, the pardon 
had created a highly welcome immunity. Still, the general pardon was also 
designed to crown the restoration of order in society, and to inaugurate a new 
era of peace, a hope that the intervention of the Sea Beggars less than two 
years later was to destroy.
Conclusion 
Geoffrey Parker has repeatedly insisted that distance complicated 
policymaking in the Spanish Monarchy, and the Beeldenstorm provides 
a telling example of this fact: when Philip ii fell ill after the news of the 
iconoclasm, the deliberations in Madrid were suspended, while Margaret 
of Parma – obliged to stay in Brussels against her will – already started to 
36 Godevaert van Haecht, Kroniek over de troebelen 
van 1565 tot 1574 te Antwerpen en elders, R. Van 
Roosbroeck (ed.) (Antwerp 1929) ii, 129: ‘’t Is in 
effeckt niets anders dan de Spaensche inquisitie 
dat er is gelesen, want de conclusie van den 
perdon is, dat gy voortaen moet een catolyck 
leven leyden of gy valt in ‘t dangier. Ende dat 
is seker.’ (text edition available online through 
www.dbnl.org). 
37 G. Marnef, ‘Protestant Conversions in an Age of 
Catholic Reformation: The Case of Sixteenth-
Century Antwerp’, in: A.-J. Gelderblom, J.L. de Jong 
and M. van Vaeck (eds.), The Low Countries as a 
Crossroads of Religious Beliefs (Leiden 2004) 49-64. 
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restore order with provisional measures. The different pacing between 
Madrid and Brussels generated constant miscommunications and delays, 
adding to the complication of events. Even so, neither distance nor time 
constituted the biggest challenge for a coordinated action during the summer 
and autumn of 1566: recent research has made it increasingly clear that the 
primary test for King and governor consisted in finding the ‘right remedies’ 
to pacify iconoclasm and armed rebellion, the most serious threat to the 
politico-religious order so far in the already rebellion-prone Netherlands. 
Time and again, Philip ii and his governors-general rejected any pacification 
strategies tending towards the sort of bi- or multi-confessionalism previously 
implemented in the Holy Roman Empire and France, fearful of losing 
souls from the ‘right’ religion. Within the geopolitical context, they also 
feared losing the Netherlands to (and a possible domino-reaction within) 
the Spanish Habsburg realms. Hence, King and governors insisted on the 
necessity of an exclusive position for Catholicism in society, and advocated 
the implementation of the Tridentine decrees as a means to contain the 
Reformation. Considering themselves to be ‘guiding lights’ on a wider 
European scene, they aspired to convince the King of France and the Emperor 
to act likewise.
That does not imply that after the Beeldenstorm the Spanish Habsburg 
authorities set out on a straightforward course of castigation and retribution 
as described in most textbooks. Rather, as has been demonstrated here, 
military repression formed only part of a broader strategy of pacification 
that also included mediation, reconciliation and reform. The tactic employed 
combined the punishment of prominent leaders with the recognition that 
most of the participants in the ‘troubles’ could neither be apprehended 
nor punished properly, so that a pardon would eventually be necessary, as 
it transpired in the end. This old dilemma regarding the use of clemency 
towards adversaries had been epitomised by then popular classical 
philosophers such as Cicero and Seneca, and equally by such contemporary 
thinkers as Machiavelli and Erasmus. Even so, after the Beeldenstorm Christian 
virtues and commonplaces more visibly underpinned the Habsburg debate on 
punishment and forgiveness. The Spanish Habsburg response therefore came 
down to a continuous patchwork of punishments for the main instigators, 
balanced by forgiveness for the many inhabitants willing to live in the 
Catholic faith. In practice, the Habsburg alternation between repression and 
reconciliation created great confusion about the actual possibility to solicit a 
remission of sins or a restitution of goods, and the longer-term genuineness of 
this policy of pacification. In times of enduring persecutions, executions and 
confiscations, it was easy for dissidents and insurgents to denounce ‘Habsburg 
clemency’ as another act of ‘Spanish duplicity’.
Finally, this contribution elaborates how Spanish Habsburg 
authorities made sure to describe the Beeldenstorm foremost as a sequence of 
acts of worldly lèse-majesté. Sacrilege and iconoclasm were largely framed as 
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an infringement of the welfare of the commonwealth, rather than as mere 
blasphemy and desecration. Iconoclasm and kerkenschenderye were said to 
have been carried out by ordinary thieves and dangerous rebels, inciting a 
revolt among the populace, rather than by heretics propagating a dissident 
faith. Even if the authorities experienced iconoclasm as outright heresy, they 
had many reasons to adopt this political discourse. First, equating divine 
lèse-majesté to worldly lèse-majesté had long been a favoured strategy of the 
Habsburg dynasty to bring religious prosecution under their control and to 
pre-empt ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The secular and legal discourse helped 
the Habsburg dynasty to safeguard authority and jurisdiction in matters of 
religion. Secondly, the laws and arrangements drafted after the Beeldenstorm 
never created a platform for religious dissidents, who were downgraded to 
ordinary thieves or rebels. Whereas executions of Protestants could create a 
forum for spreading heterodoxy, the legal documents almost literally passed 
over the religious agenda of iconoclasm in silence. Thirdly, by legitimating 
repression in the Low Countries as a lawful action against rebels, the 
Habsburg dynasty could obtain assistance from the Emperor or from German 
mercenaries in countering the Beeldenstorm, while opening a margin to bargain 
with those who only opposed the Habsburg regime for political motives.
Most unexpectedly, the Beeldenstorm called into play the role of 
the local nobility in these royal strategies of pacification. In the summer 
and autumn of 1566, most local elites claimed a crucial part in the peace-
making process, especially as the Habsburg military presence was weak 
and the treasury empty. The agreement of 23-25 August after all, had 
licensed local lords to stop hedge preaching and iconoclasm. During the 
immediate aftermath of iconoclasm, aristocrats also engaged in organising 
capital punishments for rioters, but in some cases they also felt forced to 
make local deals with Protestants, most notably those brokered by Orange 
in Antwerp, Egmond in Ghent and Hornes in Tournai. Already under 
suspicion in Madrid, the Dutch nobility were now thought to have stirred 
up iconoclasm, or if not causing it, at least allowing it or even abetting it. 
As a result, the Council of Troubles took its mission to include especially 
the exemplary execution of leading aristocrats. All this should have paved 
the way for the entry of the merciful King, who in the end never came. 
In his absence, on 16 July 1570, the Duke of Alba promulgated a general 
pardon for the multitude who had been compromised in the troubles, in 
an ultimate attempt to restore order and pacify Dutch society. Hence, the 
King and his governor general implemented different strategies than did 
their French counterparts, who tried to accommodate both Protestant and 
Catholic nobility at court and whose pacification edicts conceded limited 
rights of worship to Protestants. With the benefit of hindsight, one can 
argue that neither of the opposite strategies of the King of Spain and the 
King of France stopped the religious and political turmoil in its tracks. 
After all, it remains mostly a rhetorical question whether princely power 
beeldenstorm: iconoclasm in the low countries
alone could have pacified the profound divisions in society caused by the 
Reformation. 
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